What if the July Crisis of 1914 had not led to war?
Within five weeks of the shots at Sarajevo, Europe's great powers were at war. What if diplomacy had contained the crisis?
What actually happened
On 28 June 1914 Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb linked to a Serbian nationalist network, shot dead Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie in Sarajevo. Austria-Hungary resolved to crush Serbia and, on 5–6 July, received Germany's assurance of support, the so-called blank cheque.
On 23 July Vienna sent Belgrade an ultimatum with a 48-hour deadline, designed to be hard to accept. Serbia's reply on 25 July was conciliatory and accepted most demands, but refused Austro-Hungarian officials taking part in the investigation on its soil. Austria-Hungary broke off relations at once. The British foreign secretary Sir Edward Grey proposed a conference of ambassadors, as had helped settle the Balkan wars of 1912–13; Germany and Austria declined.
Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on 28 July. Russia began general mobilisation on 30 July. Germany, whose war plan required attacking France through Belgium before Russia was ready, declared war on Russia on 1 August and on France on 3 August, and invaded Belgium. Britain declared war on 4 August.
The turning point
The crisis offered several exits: Vienna accepting Serbia's reply, a conference in London, the 'halt in Belgrade' proposal under which Austria would occupy the Serbian capital and then negotiate, or a delay in Russian mobilisation. Each was discussed in late July, and each failed.
Why is one of the most contested questions in modern history. Fritz Fischer argued that Germany's leaders sought war; Christopher Clark's The Sleepwalkers spreads responsibility across all the powers and stresses miscalculation; Margaret MacMillan and Annika Mombauer emphasise how military planning and alliance commitments narrowed choices. Most agree that war was not inevitable on 28 June.
The world that might have been
In Crown & Plough the alternative reads: Serbia accepted nearly every clause of Vienna's ultimatum, and an ambassadors' conference in London covered the rest; no mobilisation order was given, and August 1914 passed quietly. In a world where Germany was never united, the game explains it differently: there was no single General Staff to bind the mobilisation timetables together, and the crisis passed to a conference. The game removes the scripted Great War and the Treaty of Versailles.
Beyond the game, avoiding war in 1914 would not have ended the tensions behind it: the naval race had cooled, but the Russian army was growing, Austria-Hungary's national problems were unresolved, and the Balkans remained unstable. Some historians think a general war would only have been postponed; others argue that rising economic ties and the deterrent of mass armies could have kept the peace.
If peace had lasted, the twentieth century becomes almost unrecognisable: no Russian Revolution in 1917 in that form, no collapse of the Habsburg, Ottoman and German empires in 1918, and no peace settlement of 1919 to shape what followed.
Ripples through time
1914 is the last turning point in the game, and two earlier ones shape it: a France that won in 1870 and left Germany disunited makes peace more likely, while a Russia triumphant in the Crimea makes it slightly less likely.
Play this turning point
Start in the Victorian Age, or take the scenario The Guns of August, which drops you into Europe as the crisis breaks. Peacemakers and the war party are the two sides; there is no Currents of History story for this one, so your contribution comes from your own realm and allegiances.
The two sides are treated as evenly matched in power, and history is weighted less heavily than for many turning points.
Play this turning point → Start the scenario “The Guns of August” →
Questions and answers
Did Serbia accept Austria-Hungary's ultimatum?
Largely. Serbia's reply of 25 July 1914 accepted most of the demands, some with reservations, but rejected the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the investigation inside Serbia. Vienna treated the reply as a rejection.
Who was responsible for the First World War?
Historians disagree. Fritz Fischer stressed German aims; Christopher Clark spreads responsibility among the powers; others emphasise Austria-Hungary's decision for war, Russia's early mobilisation or Germany's war plan. Most agree war was not inevitable.
What was the blank cheque?
Germany's assurance, given on 5–6 July 1914, that it would support Austria-Hungary in whatever action it took against Serbia.
Sources and further reading
Modern accounts: Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers; Margaret MacMillan, The War That Ended Peace; Annika Mombauer, The Origins of the First World War; Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War.